Testimony on Texas Open Enrollment Charter Schools

María “Cuca� Robledo Montecel, Ph.D.
Executive Director, Intercultural Development Research Association
Submitted to the Texas House of Representatives Interim Committee on Public Education
The Honorable Jim Dunnam, Chair
August 2000

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am Dr. María Robledo Montecel and I represent the Intercultural Development Research Association (IDRA), a non-profit education research and training organization based in San Antonio. IDRA was created in 1973 to advocate improvement of educational opportunities for all children, and particularly those children too often ill-served by Texas public schools: those who are minority, low-income or limited English proficient.

In 1995, the Texas Legislature authorized the creation of a pilot program of 20 open enrollment charter schools. Charter schools were authorized to offer options for community-based groups that sought to create educational alternatives that might better serve small groups of children living in communities around the state. In that bill, Senate Bill 7, you approved the creation of three charter school options: home rule charter schools, campus or campus program charters, and open enrollment charter schools. I will limit my remarks to open enrollment charter schools, for it is this option that concerns IDRA greatly. What began as a small experiment limited to 20 open enrollment schools has grown to include authorization for up to 100 such schools and an unlimited number of open enrollment charter schools serving primarily students identified as “at risk.� Seldom in the history of this state has a questionable concept moved so far and so quickly with little or no evidence of effectiveness.

In 1997, the legislature authorized the expansion of the open enrollment charter schools from the original 20 to 100. What justified this expansion? Certainly not any information on their effectiveness. Although the legislation called for an annual evaluation, by 1996 only 17 schools were in actual operation and most had little or no data on which to make conclusive judgements. According to that initial evaluation report, clients seemed to be generally “pleased� with the basic workings of these schools, but the absence of substantive student test data made it difficult to assess whether or not these alternatives were working. Compounding the evaluation was the fact that these schools operated under an alternative accountability system which made the collection of critical quantitative data impossible and the chances for a comprehensive, substantive and definitive evaluation impossible.

The second open enrollment charter school evaluation report, Texas Open-Enrollment Charter Schools: Year One Evaluation (December 1997), began to suggest that open enrollment schools were not delivering on their promise to provide an effective alternative to local neighborhood public schools. The group studying open enrollment charter schools again noted that, while customers seemed generally pleased with their operation, very limited data on student achievement was collected. Unfortunately this evaluation information was not available at the time that the 1997 legislature revisited this issue. In those 1997 hearings, education committee members listened to an impressive presentation orchestrated by a sub-group of open enrollment charter schools that recommended the state expand open enrollment charters for schools specializing in serving students considered to be in at-risk situations. While the anecdotal stories of success presented at the committee were heartwarming, the actual student performance data on most open enrollment charter schools were either unavailable or unimpressive. Once again, the bottom line of student achievement was not addressed. Charter school advocates defended the concept again in 1997, arguing that although the data were inconclusive, it was too early to make conclusive judgements about open enrollment charter schools.

The 1999 charter school evaluation, analyzing the third year of open enrollment and “at-risk� open enrollment charter schools more conclusively observes that these alternative panaceas are long on promises but fall very short on actually delivering better educational opportunities for their charges. Though many of the parents of these schools are reportedly satisfied with their efforts, data are emerging that contradict the qualitative survey findings focusing on client satisfaction.

According to the latest evaluation of open enrollment and at-risk open enrollment charter schools, Texas Open-Enrollment Charter Schools: Third Year Evaluation (July 2000), these alternative schools suffer from an annual turnover rate of students that is twice the state average mobility rate. While regular public schools average 23 percent mobility from year to year, open enrollment charter schools experience a 55 percent turnover rate. While researchers propose that charter school parents are “choosers� and thus more likely to choose to move their pupils from one school to another, the excessive student turnover suggests that many of these same parents are dissatisfied with what they encounter and thus are constantly shopping for a better alternative. This above average mobility may, in fact, harm students by disrupting their education when schools fail to help students adjust to their new environment.

In analyzing the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS) performance levels of charter schools, the evaluation report notes,“It is apparent from an examination of the data… that performance in charter schools is lower in all areas [reading, math and writing], particularly in mathematics and writing� (pg. 32, Part 2). Not only are all students in charter schools under-performing when compared to state averages for non-charter school students, but the major ethnic sub-groups attending these schools are also scoring below their public school counterparts. According to the report “TAAS performance by subgroup also shows charter school performance to be lower than the state subgroup averages� (pg. 32, Part 2). The authors express particular concern that the TAAS performance levels of African American students in charter schools (who are over-represented when compared to their proportion of the public school enrollment) lag behind their counter-parts in regular public schools.

The authors of the report propose that the presence of greater numbers of less experienced [and non-certified] teaching staff in charter schools may account for some of the difference, particularly in mathematics performance.

The table below, drawn from data included in the 2000 evaluation report reflects the achievement differences noted.

Going beyond these analyses, the report even compares a sub-set of selected charter schools against a Texas Education Agency (TEA)-selected “peer group� of similar or comparable public schools. These comparisons echo the differences noted for the larger groups as a whole. The only notable exception is the performance of a charter school in Houston that draws its enrollment primarily from a sub-set of medical workers in the Houston medical center area (pg. 33, Part 2).

The evaluation also examines data from a subset of “at-risk� charter schools, those where 75 percent of the enrollment is comprised of students meeting the state criteria for “at risk.� These data reflect that though this sub-group shows impressive gains from 1998 to 1999, they still lag far behind even the achievement levels of the state average for low-income pupils. A major question is whether these schools can maintain that level of improvement over time, a question that may be answered in the next year's evaluations of these programs.

In addition to collecting data on TAAS performance, the evaluation also analyzed charter school data on attendance rates, student dropouts and completion rates. As was the case with the TAAS, charter schools as a whole lagged behind state averages on each of these indicators. Attendance – recognized as critical to the learning process – was at only 84 percent at charter schools compared to the state average of 92.6 percent in regular public schools. Dropout rates (even using TEA’s drastic underestimates) were 10 times higher at charter schools and completion rates also trailed the state averages.

The evaluation study also analyzed charter school personnel, revenue and expenditure data. As noted earlier the data reflect that charter school staff on average have of five fewer years of teaching experience, employ about a third with five or more years of experience (compared to 72.8 percent in public schools) and experience more than a 55 percent teacher turnover rate, three times the 15.4 percent state average (pg. 27, Part 2).

The report reflects that charter schools receive approximately $2,000 more per pupil in state aid than is provided to public schools ($4,225 versus $2,275). This reflects the charter schools’ almost total reliance on state-provided funding. Public schools funded with local and state monies have an average revenue of $5,658 per pupil contrasted to $4,709 in charter schools. Expenditures in 1998-99 averaged $4,663 in charter schools, about $600 less than the $5,219 spent in the regular public schools. The more limited funding base explains the notable differences in fund balances, considered critical in helping schools meet unexpected expenses, with charter schools reflecting a 3 percent fund balance compared to an average 21 percent balance in regular schools.

The abundance of information available in the latest charter school evaluation suggests that it is appropriate to revisit state policies in this area. Though initially viewed as an attractive alternative by some critics of regular public schools, open enrollment and “at-risk� charter schools have fallen far short of the results originally promised by their proponents. From the data available to date, there is no support for further expansion or even the continued state support for many of the charter schools currently in operation. Most importantly many students, including considerable numbers of minority and low-income pupils enrolled in these alternative settings are not being served well, and are thus falling behind many of their peers enrolled in traditional public schools.

Given the mounting evidence of the ineffectiveness of many charter schools, IDRA strongly recommends the following policy reforms:

1. That the state education commissioner and State Board of Education be directed to not authorize nor approve additional open enrollment or “at-risk� open enrollment charter schools.
2. That the education commissioner be directed to create and implement a new procedure for reviewing existing charter schools’ performances and initiating a process for the expedited rescinding of charter schools that are failing to meet state designated minimal performance criteria (AEIS).
3. That the state in the future reinstate a limit on the number of open enrollment and at-risk charter schools.
4. That the state modify existing policies so that charter schools serve as pilot programs that will be encouraged to implement innovative strategies that will help inform and improve local public school operations.

References

Texas Open-Enrollment Charter Schools: Year One Evaluation (December 1997).
Taebal, D., and E.J. Barrett, C.T. Brenner. School of Urban and Public Affairs, University of Texas at Arlington.
Kemerer, F., and C. Ausbrooks. Center for the Study of Education Reform, University of North Texas.
Clark, C., and K. Thomas, K.L. Briggs. Texas Center for Educational Research.
Parker, A. Texas Justice Foundation.
Weiher, G., and R. Matland, K. Tedin, C. Cookson, L. Nielsen. The Center for Public Policy, University of Houston.
Texas Open-Enrollment Charter Schools: Third Year Evaluation (July 2000).
School of Urban Affairs, University of Texas at Arlington.
Center for the Study of Educational Reform, University of North Texas.
Center for Public Policy, University of Houston.
Texas Center for Educational Research